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Abstract—Discriminatory channel estimation (DCE) is a re-
cently developed strategy to enlarge the performance difference
between a legitimate receiver (LR) and an unauthorized receiver
(UR) in a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless sys-
tem. Specifically, it makes use of properly designed training
signals to degrade channel estimation at the UR which in turn
limits the UR’s eavesdropping capability during data transmis-
sion. In this paper, we propose a new two-way training scheme
for DCE through exploiting a whitening-rotation (WR) based
semiblind method. To characterize the performance of DCE, a
closed-form expression of the normalized mean squared error
(NMSE) of the channel estimation is derived for both the LR
and the UR. Furthermore, the developed analytical results on
NMSE are utilized to perform optimal power allocation between
the training signal and artificial noise (AN). The advantages of
our proposed DCE scheme are two folds: 1) compared to the
existing DCE scheme based on the linear minimum mean square
error (LMMSE) channel estimator, the proposed scheme adopts
a semiblind approach and achieves better DCE performance; 2)
the proposed scheme is robust against active eavesdropping with
the pilot contamination attack, whereas the existing scheme fails
under such an attack.
Index Terms—Two-way training, discriminatory channel esti-
mation, semiblind approach, pilot contamination attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Eavesdropping by unauthorized receivers has become a
prevalent security threat in wireless communications due to the
broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Therefore, discrim-
inating the signal reception performance between a legitimate
receiver (LR) and an unauthorized receiver (UR) becomes an
important issue in secure communications [1,2]. To address
the issue, the concept of physical layer security [3,4] has been
introduced which utilizes the physical layer properties of a
wireless channel to achieve the desired discriminatory channel
performance. From an information-theoretic perspective, the
studies in [5-7] showed that the maximal data rate can be
achieved by exploiting the difference in the channel conditions
between the LR and the UR, while preventing the UR from
eavesdropping any information from the received signals.
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Moreover, [8] investigated the secrecy improvement resulting
from frequency selectivity in MIMO-OFDM systems. From a
signal processing perspective, various beamforming schemes
[9,10] have been developed to enhance the signal reception at
the LR whilst limiting the quality of signal at the UR. The
beamforming design requires the channel state information
(CSI) of the LR and/or the UR priori. The physical layer
security can be used in many application senarios [5-7], e.g.,
the two-way relaying [11-13].
Several studies on physical layer security mainly focus on
data transmission without the assumption of perfect CSI. The
pilot transmission phase is the period to acquire CSI. It is
known that channel estimation performance has a significant
effect on data detection. This observation has motivated the
development of a new training strategy called discriminatory
channel estimation (DCE) such that the channel estimation
at the UR is much worse than the channel estimation at the
LR. For this, artificial noise (AN) [14-16] is inserted in the
training signals to jam the UR while keeping a minimal level
of interference to the LR. Chang et al. [17] first designed
a DCE scheme by employing multiple feedback-and-training
processes. This scheme requires large training overhead and
high design complexity. Later, a two-way training based DCE
scheme was proposed in the study [18] to reduce overhead
and hence improve the efficiency of DCE over the original
scheme in [17]. The two-way DCE scheme in [18] works well
against passive eavesdropping attack from the UR. However,
as we will show in this paper, the two-way DCE scheme is
not able to achieve the desired performance under an active
eavesdropping named the pilot contamination attack [19]. The
pilot contamination attack makes use of the fixed and publicly
known training sequence used by the LR in the reverse training
phase in order to influence the channel estimation at the
transmitter (TX). Therefore, it is important to design a robust
DCE scheme against the pilot contamination attack, which
does not require any fixed and known training sequence at
the LR.
In this paper, we propose a new two-way training scheme
via whitening-rotation (WR) based semiblind approach [20-
22]. The proposed scheme includes two phases: 1) the LR
transmits a sequence of stochastic signals in the reverse
training phase. These signals are only known by the LR itself,
facilitating CSI acquisition at the TX; 2) the TX broadcasts a
new sequence of pilots inserted by AN in the forward training
phase. This will enable the channel estimation at the LR while
2disrupting the channel estimation at the UR. With respect to
the proposed scheme, we have the following contributions.
• The proposed WR-based DCE scheme achieves a better
DCE performance than the existing LMMSE-based DCE
scheme in [18]. By combining the blind and training-
based algorithms, the WR-based semiblind techniques
can potentially enhance the quality of DCE. As shown in
our numerical results, the proposed scheme outperforms
the existing scheme with the same training overhead.
• Another advantage of the proposed DCE scheme is the
provision of a way to protect against the pilot contamina-
tion attack due to the randomness feature in the training
signal used by the LR. We present an analytical model
to demonstrate effective attack protection and show that
such attack has a minor impact on the DCE performance.
• Moreover, we analytically evaluate the DCE performance
of the proposed scheme by deriving the NMSE of channel
estimation at both the LR and the UR. The optimal power
allocation between the training signals and the AN is also
investigated and an efficient solution is obtained as an
one-dimensional line search.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
the system model and problem description are presented in
Section II. The proposed two-way training scheme using the
WR-based channel estimator is presented in Section III. The
performance analysis under the pilot contamination attack is
discussed in Section IV. Next, simulation results are given in
Section V, followed by the conclusions in Section VI. Through
the paper, we adopt the following notations:
TABLE I
NOTATION LIST IN THIS PAPER
Symbols Notations
∗ conjugate
T transpose
H complex conjugate transpose
◦ Hadamard product
Tr(·) the trace of a matrix
‖ · ‖F Frobenius norm
diag(·) a stacking of the diagonal elements
of the involved matrix into a vector
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. System Model
As shown in Fig.1, we consider a wireless MIMO system
consisting of a transmitter (TX), a legitimate receiver (LR)
and an unauthorized receiver (UR). In the system, the TX, the
LR and the UR have NT , NL, and NU antennas (NT > NL),
respectively. The TX is connected to one LR and one UR by
means of two different communication channels, namely legit-
imate channel and wiretap channel. The legitimate channel and
the wiretap channel are denoted as H ∈ CNL×NT , G ∈ CNU×NT ,
respectively. Besides, the channel from the LR to the UR is
denoted as B ∈ CNU×NL .
To enable the LR to interpret the legitimate channel, the TX
needs to emit a sequence of training pilots, but this also allows
the UR to perform wiretap channel estimation. Therefore, the
design of pilot signal is required to ensure a high quality
Fig. 1. A wireless MIMO system includes a multi-antennas transmitter (TX),
a multi-antennas legitimate receiver (LR) and a multi-antennas unauthorized
receiver (UR).
channel estimation at the LR but also prevent the UR from
estimating the wiretap channel.
The system model is based on the following assumptions.
1) Channels are assumed to be independently distributed
and have reciprocity, e.g., matrix H represents downlink
legitimate channel and HT is uplink legitimate channel.
Besides, matrices H, G and B are assumed to be the
Rayleigh flat fading channels.
2) The entries of channel matrices H, G and B are assumed
to be i.i.d, CN (0, σ2H), CN (0, σ2G) and CN (0, σ2B), re-
spectively; moreover, the entries of receiver noises are
assumed to be the same as independent additive white
Gaussian distributed, i.i.d, CN (0, σ20).
The reciprocal assumption indicates that the uplink and
downlink channel paths are similar, which happens in time-
division duplex (TDD) systems [23]. Such assumption is very
critical for the two-way training, and this paper mainly focuses
on the design of a DCE scheme in a TDD systems; besides,
the Rayleigh flat fading channel assumption indicates that
channels are relatively fixed over the transmission of symbols
in one time slot but change randomly between time slots.
For the second assumption of the system, it refers that the
conditions of channels and noises are respectively treated as
same for the sake of fair performance.
In this paper, two eavesdropping scenarios are taken into
account, that is, passive eavesdropping and active eavesdrop-
ping (pilot contamination attack [19]). For the first case, the
UR only silently receives signals via channels G and B
during the training phase. For the latter case, the UR not
only receives signals but also emits false training pilots from
the uplink channel GT within the training process. Such pilot
contamination attack is a potential threat for the two-way
training.
B. The Existing Two-way Training Scheme
The two-way training includes a reverse training phase and
a forward training phase. For the reverse training phase, the
LR sends a reverse training signal to the TX as
S0 =
√
P0
NL
T0C0 (1)
3where P0 is the power of the training pilot, and the reverse
pilot matrix C0 ∈ CNL×T1 satisfies an orthogonal condition
C0C
H
0 = INL . The received signal at the TX is given by
X0 = H
TS0 +E0, (2)
where E0 ∈ CNT×T0 refers to the AWGN matrix. By employ-
ing the linear minimum mean-square error (LMMSE) method
[24], the channel estimation at the TX is given by
Hˆ0 = σ
2
H(σ
2
HS0S
H
0 + σ
2
0INL)
−1S0X
H
0 . (3)
In the forward training phase, the TX transmits a sequence
of forward training signals inserted with AN to enable channel
estimation at the LR while degrading the channel acquisition at
the UR. In particular, the AN-aided training sequence, denoted
by S1, has the following expression
S1 ,
√
P1
NT
T1C1 +NHˆ0A, (4)
where P1 denotes the power of forward training pilots, T1 is
the training length, C1 ∈ CNT×T1 represents the forward pilot
matrix which satisfies an orthogonal condition C1CH1 = INT .
Here, NHˆ0 is a matrix whose column vectors form an orthog-
onal basis for the left null space of Hˆ0, that is, NHHˆ0Hˆ0 = 0
and NH
Hˆ0
NHˆ0 = INT−NL . In addition, A ∈ C(NT−NL)×T1 is the
AN matrix with each component being i.i.d. CN (0, σ2a).
The received signals at the LR and the UR are respectively
given by
X1 = HS1 +E1, (5)
Y1 =GS1 + F1, (6)
where E1 ∈ CNL×T1 and F1 ∈ CNU×T1 are the AWGN
matrices. By using the LMMSE, the channel estimation at the
LR can be expressed as
Hˆ1 = σ
2
H{(σ2HS1SH1 + σ20INT)−1S1XH1 }T. (7)
The UR also makes use of the received signals for its channel
estimation in the same manner as (7), but the channel perfor-
mance at the UR would be restricted due to the AN.
III. PROPOSED DCE SCHEME UNDER PASSIVE
EAVESDROPPING
A. Preliminary of Whitening-Rotation based Channel Esti-
mator
We first give a brief introduction of the WR-based semi-
blind channel approach [20-22]. The channel matrix HT is
firstly estimated in the reverse training phase, so we take the
decomposition of channel HT as an example by
HT =WQH, (8)
where W ∈ CNT×NL is a whitening matrix and Q ∈ CNL×NL is
an unitary rotation matrix, i.e., QHQ = QQH = INL . Besides,
performing singular value decomposition (SVD) [25] on the
channel HT gives
HT = UHTΣHTV
H
HT , (9)
where diag(ΣH) = [ξ1, ..., ξNL ]T. One possible choice of W
and Q can be UHTΣHT and VHT , respectively. Without loss
of generality, the channel estimation can be divided into two
steps with the WR-based semiblind method:
1) Estimate the whitening matrixW in a blind fashion using
the autocorrelation matrix of the received signals along
with a subspace based method.
2) Estimate the unitary rotation matrix Q using the training
pilots with the constrained maximum likelihood (ML)-
based method.
The two-steps of the WR-based channel estimator provides
a new training design for improving the DCE performance.
Specifically, the WR-based semiblind method can be used for
the channel estimation both at the LR and the UR during the
two-way training.
B. Our Proposed WR-based DCE Scheme
1) Step I. reverse training phase: The LR sends the reverse
training signals to the TX for the uplink channel estimation
without benefiting the channel estimation process at the UR.
In the proposed scheme, the design of reverse training signals
has the same expression of (1). Different from the existing
two-way training, these reverse training signals are randomly
generated at the LR and only known by itself, therefore,
the TX can not apply the LMMSE method for the channel
estimation.
Here, the TX can resort to the blind part of the WR-
based semiblind method for the partial acquisition of channel
HT. Specifically, we estimate the whitening matrix of HT by
performing SVD on the autocorrelation matrix of the received
signals, which has the following form
RX0 ,
X0X
H
0
P0
NL T0
. (10)
Referring to (10), we can estimate the whitening matrix of
HT as
Wˆ0 =
1√
P0
UX0Σ
1
2
X0
(11)
by performing SVD on RX0 . By using (2) , the autocorrela-
tion matrix RX0 can be expressed by
RX0 = H
TH∗ +∆RX0 . (12)
From (12), the error of RX0 has the following form
∆RX0 =
NL
P0
(HT∆RS0,E0 +∆R
H
S0,E0
H∗ +∆RE0,E0),
(13)
where the cross correlation matrices ∆RS0,E0 ,∆RE0,E0 are
defined as follows, respectively
∆RS0,E0 ,
S0E
H
0
T0
,
∆RE0,E0 ,
E0E
H
0
T0
.
Considering the noise interference, the error of the estimated
Wˆ0 can be defined as
∆W0 , Wˆ0 −W. (14)
4By using the results of (8) and (13), ∆W0 can be deduced
as
∆W0 =
NL
P0
∆RHS0,E0Q. (15)
2) Step II. forward training phase: For the forward training
phase, the design of forward training sequence is required to
enable the LR to interpret the downlink channel information
but degrade the channel performance at the UR. Here, the new
forward training signal is given by
S1 ,
√
P1
NT
T1C1 +NWˆ0A, (16)
where NWˆ0 ∈ CNL×(NT−NL) is the orthogonal comple-
ment space matrix of Wˆ0 satisfying NHWˆ0Wˆ0 = 0 and
NH
Wˆ0
NWˆ0 = INT−NL . Compared to (4), (16) utilizes the left
null space of Wˆ0 instead of HˆT0 for the generation of AN.
In fact, the left null spaces to the matrices Wˆ0 and HˆT0 are
same because the matrix Wˆ0 has all the eigenvalues of HˆT0.
We denote the first term of (16) as
S˜1 =
√
P1
NT
T1C1.
The LR may suffer from the the imperfect estimation of
W0 due to the interference of AN, thus the power allocation
problem between P1 and σ2a needs to be allocated carefully.
2.1) Channel estimation at the LR: Using (5) and (16),
the received signal matrix at the LR can be rewritten as follows
LR : X1 = HS˜1 + E˜1, (17)
where
E˜1 , HNWˆ0A+E1.
We apply the WR-based semiblind channel estimator for the
channel estimation at the LR. First, the whitening matrix of
H can be estimated as
Wˆ1 = V
∗
XˆW
ΣT
XˆW
(18)
by performing SVD on the matrix
XˆW ,
X1S˜
H
1
P1
NT T1
, (19)
where
XˆW = UXˆWΣXˆWV
H
XˆW
.
After that, the unitary rotation matrix of H can be obtained
by solving the following optimization problem under the
perturbation-free case,
LR : minf(Q) =
NL∑
i=1
‖ X1(i)−
NT∑
j=1
σˆjq∗ijSˆ1(j) ‖2F
s.t. QQH = INL ,
(20)
where Sˆ1 = VHXW S˜1, X1(i) represents the ith column of X1
and Sˆ1(j) refers to the jth column of Sˆ1, respectively. By
using the Lagrange method (the derivation can be found in
appendix A), the unitary rotation matrix can be calculated as
follows
Qˆ1 = UXˆQV
H
XˆQ
(21)
by performing SVD on the matrix
XˆQ ,
X∗1S˜
T
1Wˆ1
P1
NT T1
, (22)
where
XˆQ = UXˆQΣXˆQV
H
XˆQ
.
According to (8), the legitimate channel H can be
calculated by Hˆ1 = Qˆ*1WˆT1.
2.2) Channel estimation at UR: Likewise, the wiretape
channel G can be decomposed as
G =MRH, (23)
where M ∈ CNU×NT is the whitening matrix, and R ∈ CNT×NT
is the unitary rotation matrix. Besides, G can be decomposed
by SVD as follows
G = UGΣGV
H
G, (24)
where diag(ΣG) = [γ1, ..., γNU ]T. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that M = UGΣG and R = VG.
When the UR employs the WR-based semiblind channel
estimator for its channel estimation, the received signal matrix
of (6) can be rewritten as follows
UR : Y1 =GS˜1 + F˜1, (25)
where F˜1 , GNWˆ0A+ F1. Then, the whitening matrix of
G can be obtained as
Mˆ = UYˆMΣYˆM (26)
by performing SVD to the matrix
YˆM ,
Y1S˜
H
1
P1
NT T1
, (27)
where
YˆM = UYˆMΣYˆMV
H
YˆM
.
Next, the rotation matrix of G can be calculated using the
training-based method [22],
Rˆ = VYˆRU
H
YˆR
(28)
by performing SVD to the matrix
YˆR ,
MˆHY1S˜
H
1
P1
NT T1
, (29)
where
YˆR = UYˆRΣYˆRV
H
YˆR
.
Using (26) and (28), the wiretap channel G can be calculated
by Gˆ = MˆRˆH.
5C. DCE Performance Analysis
We mainly discuss the DCE performance in this Section.
A quantitative analysis of power allocation is offered for the
optimal DCE scheme.
1) Channel estimation performance at the LR: To analyze
channel estimation performance, we define the perturbation
errors of Wˆ1 and Qˆ1, i.e., ∆W1 , Wˆ1 −W and ∆Q1 ,
Qˆ1 −Q. The estimation error of H at the LR is given by
∆H1 , Hˆ1−H = Qˆ∗WˆT1−Q∗WT1 ≈ Q∗∆WT1+∆Q∗1WT.
(30)
First, we derive the closed-form expression of ∆W1.
Similar to (15), ∆W1 has the following expression
∆W1 =
NT
P1
QT∆R∗
S˜1,E˜1
, (31)
where
∆RS˜1,E˜1 =∆RS˜1,E1 +∆RS˜1,AN
H
Wˆ0
HH.
Notice that NT
Wˆ0
Wˆ0 = 0, (31) can be rewritten as
∆W1 =
NT
P1
QT(∆R∗
S˜1,E1
− 1
P0
∆R∗
S˜1,A
NT
Wˆ0
∆RHS0,E0).
(32)
Next, we deduce the closed-form expression of∆Q1. Using
the result of [22], ∆Q1 equals to
∆Q1 ≈ Q(ΓQ ◦ΠQ)H, (33)
where
ΓQ =


1
2ξ2
1
, ... , 1
ξ2
1
+ξ2NL
1
ξ2
2
+ξ2
1
, ... , 1
ξ2
2
+ξ2NL
....
1
ξ2NL
+ξ2
1
, ... , 1
2ξ2NL

 (34)
and
ΠQ =∆X
H
QQ−QH∆XQ. (35)
To derive the perturbation error of ∆XQ, we define
XˆQ , XQ +∆XQ. Using (5), (22) can be modified as
XˆQ = H
∗W +H∗∆W1 +
NT
P1
∆RT
S˜1,E˜1
W. (36)
Therefore, we have
∆XQ = H
∗∆W1 +
NT
P1
∆RT
S˜1,E˜1
W. (37)
Substituting (37) into (35) , we have
ΠQ = 0. (38)
As a result, (33) can be summarized as ∆Q1 = 0, and the
perturbation error of Hˆ1 is given by
∆H1 =
P1
NT
(∆R∗
S˜1,E1
− NL
P0
∆R∗
S˜1,A
NT
Wˆ0
∆RHS0,E0).
(39)
Similar to the derivation of [22], the NMSE criterion like [24]
of the estimated matrix H at the LR is given by
NMSEL ,
Tr(E{∆H1∆HH1})
NLNT
=
NTσ20
P1T1
+
NL(NT − NL)σ2a
P0T0
NTσ20
P1T1
.
(40)
2) Channel estimation performance at the UR: We define
the perturbation errors of Mˆ and Rˆ, i.e., ∆M , Mˆ −M
and ∆R , Rˆ −R. In the following, the estimation error of
channel G can be given by
∆G , Gˆ−G = MˆRˆH −MRH ≈M∆RH +∆MRH.
(41)
First, we derive the closed-form expression of ∆M. Similar
to (15), ∆M has the following expression
∆M =
NT
P1
∆RH
S˜1,F˜1
R, (42)
where
∆RS˜1,F˜1 ,∆RS˜1,AN
H
Wˆ0
GH +∆RS˜1,F1 .
Next, we deduce the closed-form expression of∆R. Similar
to (33), the perturbation matrix of Rˆ is given by
∆R ≈ R(ΓR ◦ΠR), (43)
where ΓR is
ΓR =


1
2γ2
1
, ... , 1
γ2
1
+γ2NU
1
γ2
2
+γ2
1
, ... , 1
γ2
2
+γ2NU
....
1
γ2NU
+γ2
1
, ... , 1
2γ2NU

 (44)
and
ΠR = R
H∆YHR −∆YRR. (45)
To derive the perturbation error matrix ∆YR, we define
YˆR , YR +∆YR. Using (6), (29) can be approximately by
YˆR ≈MHG+∆MHG+ NTP1M
H∆RH
S˜1,F˜1
, (46)
Therefore,
∆YR =∆M
HG+
NT
P1
MH∆RH
S˜1,F˜1
. (47)
Substituting (47) into (45), we have ΠR = 0. As a result, (43)
can be summarized as ∆R = 0. Then, the perturbation matrix
of Gˆ can be yielded as
∆G =
NT
P1
(GNWˆ0∆RS˜1,A +∆RS˜1,F1). (48)
In consequence, the NMSE criterion of estimated G at the UR
can be derived by
NMSEU ,
Tr(E{∆G∆GH})
NTNU
=
NTσ20 + NT(NT − NL)σ2aσ2G
P1T1
.
(49)
6Comparing (40) and (49), we find that the NMSE per-
formance at the LR and the UR are mainly relevant to the
selection of power values among the training pilots and AN.
When the power of training pilots becomes stronger, the
precision of the channel estimation is higher for the LR but
lower for the UR. Alternatively, the estimation precision is
lower for the LR while higher for the UR when the power of
training pilots becomes lower. Therefore, a power allocation
trade-off exists between the training pilots and AN.
3) Optimal Power Allocation between the Training Pilots
and AN: One needs to allocate the available power between
the training pilots and the AN carefully through minimizing
the channel estimation error at the LR while restricting the
estimation error at the UR. We formulate the power allocation
as the following optimization problem
min
P0,P1>0,σ2a>0
NMSEL (50)
s.t. NMSEU ≥ γ, (50a)
P0 ≤ Pave (50b)
P1 + (NT −NL)σ2a ≤ Pave, (50c)
where γ > 0 refers to the threshold of the UR’s achievable
NMSE, and Pave is the total energy constraint of the training
signal. We define x = P1T1
NT
, y = (NT−NL)σ2a, z = P0. Then,
the problem (50) can be reformulated as
min
x>0,y≥0
σ20
x
+
yNLσ
2
0
xz
(51)
s.t.
σ20
x
+
yσ2G
x
≥ γ, (51a)
z ≤ Pave, (51b)
xNT
T1
+ y ≤ Pave. (51c)
The problem (51) is a convex optimization problem involv-
ing three variables (x, y, z). We will prove that the three-
dimensional optimization problem can be solved by a simple
one-dimensional line search [26]. (The proof can be found in
the Appendix B.)
• Proposition 1. Let {x∗, y∗, z∗} be the optimal solution
to the convex optimization problem in (51) with the
constraint that NTσ
2
0
PaveT1
≤ γ ≤ (NT − NL)Pave. The
optimal value of x can be solved by the following one-
dimensional optimization problem
min
x
σ20
x
+
y(x)NLσ
2
0
xz
(52)
s.t.
σ20
γ
≤ x ≤ (σ
2
GPave + σ
2
0)T1
γT1 +NTσ2G
, (52a)
where
y(x∗) =
xγ − σ20
σ2G
,
z∗ = Pave.
The associated values of y∗,z∗ are given by y(x∗), Pave,
respectively.
With the result of Proposition 1, we can construct well
designed training sequences for achieving optimal DCE per-
formance.
IV. PROPOSED DCE SCHEME UNDER THE PILOT
CONTAMINATION ATTACK
In this Section, we analyze the performance of our proposed
DCE scheme under the pilot contamination attack.
A. The Existing Pilot Contamination Attack
Under the existing two-way training scheme, the pilot
contamination attack is possible when the reverse training
pilots are known by the UR. Notice that the publicly known
reverse training pilots provide an opportunity for the UR to
make an adverse influence on the channel estimation at the
TX. In particular, the UR sends the reverse training pilots at
the same time as the LR’s transmission during the reverse
training phase. With the additive AWGN matrix F0 ∈ CNT×T0 ,
the received signals at the TX are given by
X0 = H
TS0 +E0 +G
TS¯0 + F0, (53)
where
S¯0 =
√
P¯0
NL
T0C¯0,
P¯0 is the power of injected fake pilot and pilot matrix C¯0
satisfies that C¯0C¯H0 = INL . If the UR knows the reverse
training pilot, then P¯0 = P0 and C¯0 = C0. For simplicity,
we define the injected noises of (53) as
F¯0 ,G
TS¯0 + F0. (54)
The pilot contamination attack can be viewed as a form of
malicious signal injection. With the injection of false training
pilot, the UR can degrade the TX’s estimation of uplink
channel HT and also align the wiretap channel estimation for
the UR. In conclusion, the impact of the pilot contamination
attack on the two-way DCE scheme has two folds: it reduces
the accuracy of the LR’s estimation of the downlink channel
due to the leakage of AN; and more seriously it increases the
UR’s channel performance.
B. The Impact of Pilot Contamination Attack on the Proposed
Scheme
For our proposed two-way training, the reverse training
pilots are randomly generated at the LR and only known
by itself. Therefore, the randomness feature of the reverse
training pilots provides a natural way of protecting against
the pilot contamination attack. Possibly, the UR may try to
exploit the received signals from channel B via the blind
detection methods [27,28]. However, the UR would suffer
from a rotation ambiguity between the estimated channel Bˆ
and channel B. Therefore, it is still no use for the UR to
interpret the reverse training pilot without the cooperation of
the LR.
Here, we consider a scenario when the UR performs pilot
contamination attack with a guessing-based way, that is, the
pilots C¯0 is randomly generated by a guess way. We employ
the WR-based semiblind channel estimator for the DCE per-
formance. In order to study such attack, we mainly focus on
its impact on the NMSE performance of the estimated channel
Hˆ1 at the LR. By using (31), the perturbation error of the
7whitening matrix to the estimated channel Hˆ1 can be rewritten
as
∆W1 =
NT
P1
QT∆R∗
S˜1,E˜1
, (55)
where
∆RS˜1,E˜1 ≈
∆RS˜1,E1 −
NL
P0
∆RS˜1,AN
H
Wˆ0
(∆RTS0,E0 +∆R
T
S0,F¯0
).
Similar to (33), the perturbation error of the unitary rotation
matrix can be deduced as ∆Q1 = 0. Hence, the perturbation
error of the estimated channel Hˆ1 is given by
∆H1 =
P1
NT
{∆R∗
S˜1,E1
− NL
P0
∆R∗
S˜1,A
NT
Wˆ0
(∆RHS0,E0 +∆R
H
S0,F¯0
)}.
(56)
With the result of (56), the NMSE criterion of the estimated
channel H1 at the LR is given by
NMSEL ≈ NTσ
2
0
P1T1
+
NL(NT − NL)σ2a
P0T0
NTσ20
P1T1
+
NL(NT − NL)σ2a
P1T1
(
NTσ20
P¯0T0
+
NUσ2G
P0T0
).
(57)
When we compare (57) and (40), the third term of (57)
is newly introduced due to the injection of fake training
pilot. The third term is significantly smaller than the first
of two terms. Therefore, the pilot contamination attack only
marginally increases the NMSE error at the LR. Furthermore,
(57) demonstrates that the power allocation using Proposition
1 is still valid under the pilot contamination attack.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider a MIMO wireless system with one LR and one
UR. In the system, we have NT = 4, NL = 2 and NU = 2.
Channel matrices H or G are i.i.d. complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variance (σ2H = σ2G = 1);
and the additive noise matrices E0, E1 or F1 are i.i.d. AWGN
(σ20 = 0.01). We set the maximum transmission power as 30
dBm, i.e., Pave = 1. The reverse training pilot matrix and the
forward pilot matrix satisfy that C0CH0 = INL , C1CH1 = INT ,
respectively. Moreover, the overall training length is given as
T = 280, in which T0 = T1 = 140. The parameter γ is set
as 0.03 or 0.1 [17]. With Pave = 1, the criterion of signal-
to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the LR and the UR can be defined
as
SNRL =
E‖ HS1 ‖2F
E‖ E1 ‖2F
=
1
σ20
,
SNRU =
E‖GS1 ‖2F
E‖ F1 ‖2F
=
1
σ20
,
(58)
where SNRL = SNRU. Here, the DCE scheme based on
the LMMSE channel estimator in [18] is employed as a
fair comparison to the proposed DCE scheme based on the
WR channel estimator. In the following, the scheme in [18]
is called as LMMSE-based DCE scheme, and the proposed
scheme is named as WR-based DCE scheme. The result of
each DCE scheme is obtained over 100,000 Monte Carlo
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Fig. 2. Power allocation among the training signals and AN in our proposed
DCE scheme
running. We first demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed
DCE scheme. Both the LR and the UR exploit their channel
estimation with the received signal samples. The optimal
power value among P1 and σ2a can be calculated via the
optimized solution of (52). Fig.2 shows that more power is
needed for the forward training pilots than the AN at all
SNR levels. There is a minor variation between the powers
of forward training pilots and the AN at all SNR levels. This
observation indicates that the power allocation solution has a
stable performance.
From Fig.3 (a) and Fig.3 (b), it is found that the NMSE
performance at the LR with the WR-based DCE scheme
achieves better DCE performance than the LMMSE-based
DCE scheme. By assuming that the TX knows perfect CSI
of the uplink channel, we illustrate the ideal lower bound of
NMSE with the proposed DCE scheme in the figures. The
gap between the ideal lower bound with perfect CSI and
the NMSE error at the LR with the LMMSE-based DCE
scheme is wide while it is very close to the WR-based DCE
scheme. Furthermore, Fig 3.(c) shows the relationship between
NMSE at the LR and the training sequence length. The NMSE
performance at the LR improves the DCE performance with
longer training pilots. Although our simulation results are
shown for the scenario where the LR and UR are at the same
distance from the TX (σ2H = σ2G), the proposed DCE scheme
works well even if the UR is much closer to the TX as long
as the transmit power is sufficiently large. The reason is that
the SNR at the UR does not change much with distance when
the inserted AN dominates the noise at the UR.
We then look into the performance of the proposed WR-
based DCE scheme under a pilot contamination attack. As we
have discussed in Section IV, the UR has no knowledge of
the reverse training signals. In addition, we suppose that the
UR sends another guess-based orthogonal signals S¯0 to attack
the system, in which P¯0 = Pave = 1. From Fig.4 (a), one
can see that the NMSE performance at the LR with LMMSE-
based DCE scheme has approximately reached the limitation
of the UR’s NMSE due to the poor channel estimation. On the
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Fig. 3. NMSE performance comparison between the LMMSE-based DCE
scheme and the WR-based DCE scheme
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9contrary, the NMSE performance at the LR with the proposed
DCE scheme only has a slight reduction. Similar results can
be observed in Fig.4 (b) in case of γ = 0.1. As a result,
the LMMSE-based DCE scheme is more sensitive to the pilot
contamination attack than our proposed DCE scheme.
Fig.4 (c) shows the impact of pilot contamination attack
on the performance of our proposed scheme with variation of
attack power. Since the LMMSE-based DCE scheme works
not very well under the pilot contamination attack, we only
focus on the performance of the proposed DCE scheme. The
result show that the obtained NMSE error at the LR has a slight
reduction with the increasing power P¯0. The attack power is
restricted at the UR, hence the pilot contamination attack has
an ignorable impact on the performance of our proposed DCE
scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new two-way training scheme
for DCE in wireless MIMO systems. To improve the DCE
performance, an efficient whitening-rotation (WR) based semi-
blind approach has been employed in the two-way training. A
closed-form of NMSE on the channel estimation between the
LR and the UR has been developed, facilitating optimal power
allocation between the training signals and AN. Furthermore,
the proposed training design offers a countermeasure against
the pilot contamination attack. It has been proved that the
pilot contamination attack has a very limited impact on the
DCE performance. Simulation results demonstrate that our
proposed scheme can achieve higher performance than the
existing training scheme.
Our future work includes the following directions of re-
search: (a) We will extend the study of DCE from narrowband
systems to wideband OFDM-based systems [29]. The power
allocation between the training signal and AN across all pilot
subcarriers will be an interesting problem to investigate. (b)
We will apply the semiblind two-way training method to tackle
the pilot contamination problem in multi-cell massive MIMO
systems.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF UNITARY ROTATION MATRIX
According to (20), the rotation matrix Q can be obtained
by using Lagrange method as follows,
LR : minf(Q, λ, µ) =
NL∑
i=1
‖ X1(i)−
NT∑
j=1
σˆjq∗ijSˆ1(j) ‖2F
+
NL∑
i=1
Re{λi(qHi qi − 1)}+
NL∑
i=1
NL∑
j=i+1
Re{µijqHi qj}.
(59)
By differentiating (59) w.r.t Q and let it equals to 0, we
have
X∗1S˜
T
1Wˆ1 −QWˆT1S˜1S˜H1Wˆ1 = QΘ, (60)
where Θ is the matrix of Lagrange multipliers which satisfies
Θii = λi,Θij = µij when i > j and Θij = µ∗ij when i < j.
We divide P1NT T1 on both sides of (60), and denote
XˆQ ,
X∗1Sˆ
T
1Wˆ1
P1
NT T1
.
Using the conjugate symmetry feature of Θ, we premultiply
QH to (60) and post-multiply QH to the conjugate of (60).
Performing a subtraction between the two new equations, we
have
QHXˆQ = Xˆ
H
QQ. (61)
According to the specific structure of (61), it holds if and only
if
Qˆ1 = UXˆQV
H
XˆQ
, (62)
where UXˆQ and VXˆQ are the decomposition results after
performing SVD on XˆQ, e.g., XˆQ = UXˆQΣXˆQV
H
XˆQ
.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF OPTIMUM POWER ALLOCATION
First, we need to develop the range of parameter γ. For the
extreme case when y = 0, we know that
x ≤ PaveT1
NT
(63)
by using the power constraint of (51c). In this case, γ has the
lower bound
γ ≥ NTσ
2
0
PaveT1
. (64)
To obtain the upper bound of γ, we need to analyze the NMSE
error performance at the UR when x = 0. Similar to (42), the
perturbation matrix of M can be rewritten as
∆M ≈∆RHA,F1NHWˆ0R, (65)
In this case, we have the result as follows
NMSEU ≈ (NT − NL)Pave. (66)
This result implies the worst MNSE performance at the UR,
so we can obtain the upper bowed of γ,
γ ≤ (NT −NL)Pmax. (67)
For the variable y, it satisfies the following inequations as
xγ − σ20
σ2G
≤ y ≤ Pave − xNT
T1
(68)
by using the constraints of (51a) and (51c). Besides, the
inequations of (68) holds if and only if
Pave − xNT
T1
≥ xγ − σ
2
0
σ2G
. (69)
Thus, x satisfies
σ20
γ
≤ x ≤ (σ
2
GPave + σ
2
0)T1
γT1 +NTσ2G
. (70)
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From the optimal problem (51), the objective function is
monotonically decreasing with respect to the variable y, so
the optimal value can be achieved when
y∗ =
xγ − σ20
σ2G
. (71)
Furthermore, z is independent from x and y, thus the objective
function approaches its optimization point when z∗ = Pave.
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